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Cricket Australia Opens Door to IPL Investors Amid Control Concerns

Cricket Australia has finally opened the door. The Indian Premier League’s power brokers are peering through it. None of them, though, is sprinting to step inside.

The decision to allow private investment into selected Big Bash League franchises has inevitably caught the eye of IPL owners and other Indian investors. CA has confirmed expressions of interest. The names are familiar ones from the global franchise circuit, the “usual suspects” of this ecosystem. Yet when approached, not one has been willing to publicly nail colours to the mast.

There is intrigue. There is curiosity. Conviction is another matter.

A billion-dollar pitch, with strings attached

To sell the project, CA has turned to the Raine Group, the US merchant bank that orchestrated the lucrative sale of The Hundred franchises in England last year. That precedent helps explain CEO Todd Greenberg’s bold branding of BBL privatisation as a “billion-dollar opportunity” for Australian cricket.

On paper, the offer starts with the Melbourne Renegades, up for 100 per cent acquisition, with CA itself – not Cricket Victoria – running the process. The sale is targeted for completion by Christmas. For any new owner, though, the Renegades are less a ready-made asset and more a blank canvas.

They would inherit a licence, not a legacy.

No embedded fan base, no long-standing tribal pull. The buyer would have to build a fresh identity in a market where the Big Bash has already plateaued once and fought hard to revive momentum.

The next wave is expected to include Hobart Hurricanes and Perth Scorchers, but there the offer shrinks: only up to 49 per cent can be sold. WACA still has to canvass its members on divestment, a debate that remains internal, but the headline is clear – CA wants money, not to surrender control.

That control clause is the first major red flag for IPL owners who are used to running the show.

Control without ownership? IPL giants hesitate

Across SA20, ILT20, CPL and even Major League Cricket, IPL-linked groups enjoy full franchise ownership. The Hundred has a slightly different structure, but even there the Indian presence is substantial and influential.

Sun Group owns 100 per cent of Sunrisers Leeds. RPSG Group holds a 70 per cent stake in Manchester Super Giants. Reliance (MI) and GMR (DC) each hold 49 per cent of MI London and Southern Brave, yet still drive operational decisions.

Control is the currency IPL owners value most. CA, led by chairman Mike Baird, is in no mood to hand it over.

“CA and its members will maintain control over the most significant aspects of Australian Cricket operations,” Baird has stressed. That includes international scheduling, player availability, Big Bash salary caps, branding proposals, licence reserve prices and investor approvals.

In other words: you can buy in, but you won’t run the game.

That stance jars with the operating model IPL groups have built elsewhere. They are not passive investors. They are empire builders, looking to align playing philosophies, commercial strategies and data systems across multiple teams and leagues. A 49 per cent stake without decisive influence feels more like a bet than a project.

Sydney friction and a split in philosophy

GMR’s global ambitions underline the tension. The co-owners of Delhi Capitals already own Hampshire County and had explored a deeper partnership in Australian cricket. Cricbuzz first revealed in January 2025 that GMR had looked at investing in Sydney and Cricket New South Wales. During the fifth and final BGT Test, their representatives were in Sydney, sounding out a possible collaboration with Cricket NSW.

That path has since hit a wall.

Cricket NSW is now understood to be opposed to private investment in its BBL setup and may not even nominate Baird for the CA chair next time. The disagreement is stark: Baird is pushing a controlled version of privatisation; Cricket NSW wants no part of it. For IPL owners, the episode is a warning sign about the political and philosophical fault lines inside Australian cricket.

They are not just buying into a league. They are buying into a system that still argues with itself about whether it even wants them.

Star power in doubt

The next sticking point is talent. Franchise investors want certainty – especially around star availability. CA cannot provide it.

Unlike the ECB, which carved out a clean window for The Hundred by keeping international cricket clear of the schedule, Australia runs the BBL alongside its international summer. Test matches, ODIs, T20Is and the Big Bash often overlap. National duty comes first. The league makes do.

For an IPL owner, that’s a problem.

There is no guarantee that Australia’s biggest names will appear regularly, or at all, for their BBL teams. Pat Cummins is the glaring example: just seven BBL games since 2016, compared with 76 IPL matches in the same period. In India, the BCCI ring-fences the IPL, ensuring contracted and marquee players are available.

MS Dhoni, Virat Kohli, Rohit Sharma, Jasprit Bumrah – between them, they have barely missed an IPL game over the last decade. That reliability underpins the league’s commercial muscle. Broadcasters and sponsors know what they are buying. Owners know who they are building around.

In Australia, the equation is far looser. A franchise might pay a premium and still see its local poster boy vanish into the Test bubble for most of the season.

International player availability is equally murky. The BBL competes directly with leagues in South Africa, UAE and Bangladesh. Taxation in Australia is significantly higher than in those countries, which immediately eats into overseas players’ earnings. When a top T20 freelancer can earn similar money with a lighter tax burden and shorter travel, the choice is obvious.

The BBL may still attract talent, but not necessarily on terms that comfort long-term investors.

Distance, dollars and the players’ union

Even the map works against CA.

Travel in Australia is punishing by franchise standards. A trip to Perth can mean five to six hours in the air. That is a very different proposition to SA20, where the longest hop between host cities is a little over two hours, or to England, UAE and the Caribbean, where distances are far more manageable.

More travel means more cost, more fatigue, more logistical headaches. Owners factor that in.

Then there is the media rights picture. CA is only three years into a seven-year broadcast deal. Any incoming investor is buying into a cycle already in motion, without the immediate upside of a rights renewal. For IPL owners used to timing their moves around fresh TV deals and escalating valuations, that dampens the short-term appeal.

Layered on top is the influence of the Australian Cricketers Association. The ACA is a powerful voice in the game’s governance and revenue-sharing models. For investors who prefer a more top-down structure – like the one they enjoy in other leagues – another strong stakeholder at the table adds complexity.

Profits on the board, questions in the air

There is, however, one number CA can point to with confidence: most BBL clubs are believed to be profitable. That is not a trivial detail. It explains why there is no unanimous appetite within CA to welcome private money. Some in the system look at balance sheets and ask why they should share.

For IPL owners, profitability is the bright spot in an otherwise tangled picture. They have already built a near-global footprint, with stakes in almost every major T20 competition except the Pakistan Super League and, so far, the BBL. Australia remains the last big market where they do not have a formal foothold.

The strategic appeal is obvious. The terms are not.

One IPL insider distilled the mood with a sharp line: “The ECB was difficult; CA is five times tougher to negotiate with.” That is not the voice of a group rushing to sign.

CA wants to turn the BBL into a billion-dollar opportunity. To get there, it may have to loosen its grip, rethink its calendar and trust outside money more than it ever has. The question now is simple: how much control is Cricket Australia really prepared to give up to turn interest into investment?